How Alexey Miller protected his subordinate

Kirill Seleznev played the role of consigliere under the head of Gazprom.
Origin source
This is the third material of our newspaper over the past two months about the former head of Gazprom Mezhregiongaz LLC Kirill Seleznev. The first (Our Version No. 36 (711) of 09/23/2019) described how the "team of businessmen" earned money on the Gazprom to Children charity program. The second (“Our Version” No. 43 (718) of 11/11/2019) disclosed schemes for running the means of the import substitution program of Gazprom.

It turns out already a whole "soap opera", but the authors of its script are not us. The fact is that after the first publication in the editorial office, there was a line of people wishing to tell about Seleznyov’s “exploits”. Therefore, we only record their testimony to facilitate the work of the FSB, the Investigative Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Prosecutor of Russia. Presenting the next (third) material on the ambiguous relationship of Cyril Seleznev and Alexei Miller ...

Our previous publication ended with the assumption that the “Seleznev group” could not act so impudently inside a state corporation without the highest cover. We remind you of the withdrawal from Gazprom of cash flows measured in billions of rubles. In addition to the head of Mezhregiongaz, the “group” included his deputies: Natalia Konovalenko (economics and finance), as well as Elena Mikhailova (legal and property relations).

The reason for the assumption that Seleznev acted "under the roof" was the fact that all the schemes for withdrawing funds from Gazprom were "sanctified" by resolutions of the head of the gas monopolist Alexei Miller. Particular piquancy to the circumstance was given not even by the volume of funds withdrawn from Gazprom, but by the way of their “sanctification” and the mechanism of internal legitimation.

For example, the resolution of Alexey Miller on the creation of an “import-substituting” supplier of material and technical resources for PJSC Gazprom on the basis of one of the gas subsidiaries (and the two Cypriot offshores looming because of it) bore the mark: “Bypass Department 201”. After Miller’s resolution, the offshore annual revenue, apparently controlled by Seleznev through his closest partners, jumped from 2 million to 23 billion rubles, and net profit from 200 thousand to 5 billion. This seems to have spawned a purchasing monopolist inside the gas monopolist.

To understand the essence and meaning of the note “bypassing Department 201” at Miller’s resolution “worth” 23 billion rubles a year, you need to know that Department 201 was previously called the Document Management and Control Department of the Executive Office. That is, the resolution passed in a kind of exclusive mode, past the official control mechanisms. Who could make such decisions bypassing the apparatus, as we wrote in our material, the question is purely rhetorical.

Another “proof” of the systemic backup for Seleznev was his appointment as the general director of RusHimAlliance LLC after the forced resignation from Gazprom related to the arrest of his personal adviser Raul Arashukov. We reminded Arashukov for the creation and participation in an organized crime group (Article 210 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), as well as the theft of 30 billion rubles from Gazprom’s total proceeds from gas payments (in our opinion, this is the direct responsibility of Mezhregiongaz and Seleznev).

RusChemAlliance is not an honorary reference to the fined, but honored top manager of the gas monopolist. This is a new “responsible” task for Seleznev. RusChemAlliance is the operator of one of Gazprom’s most ambitious projects - the construction of a complex for the processing of ethanol-containing gas and the production of liquefied natural gas in Ust-Luga. The project budget is 2.388 trillion rubles, and most of it will be generated by the National Welfare Fund of Russia and the state Vnesheconombank.
It would seem, what other arguments and proofs are needed? However, as it turned out, there are other, more compelling, arguments and evidence. The question is their relevance by the relevant authorities.

Planned departure

Today we can safely assume that Seleznev’s dismissal from Gazprom was a well-planned retreat to previously prepared positions. It took a little over two months to prepare these positions.

Raul Arashukov was arrested on January 30, 2019, and his immediate superior, member of the Gazprom Management Committee, head of the 614 Department (marketing, gas and liquid hydrocarbon processing) and general director of Gazprom Mezhregiongaz LLC Kirill Seleznev left all his posts only on April 12, 2019 of the year. Why do we think that all this time preparations were underway for new positions for old schemes for withdrawing funds from Gazprom? For a very simple reason. Day to day with the dismissal of Seleznev (April 12), Elena Mikhailova, who was his deputy at Mezhregiongaz, sent a letter No. 01/05-3496 to Alexei Miller about transferring part of Mezhregiongaz's assets to the control of newly created legal entities.

A small but necessary retreat here. Mikhailov remained Deputy General Director of Mezhregiongaz until May 18, 2019, combining the position in a subsidiary with the position of a member of the Gazprom Management Committee, and the Head of Department 105 (Property and Corporate Relations Management). The fact is indicative in itself. And he shows the significance of Mezhregiongaz in the internal hierarchy of the gas monopolist.

And now to the letter. It is very remarkable in its content and with careful reading it allows you to understand a lot about the internal kitchen of Gazprom. The letter is worthy of quoting almost entirely. It seems that, as we see, it is about taking away from Mezhregiongaz all the assets previously used by the Seleznev group to withdraw funds from the parent company, we list it point by point.

The first is to transfer to trust management, and subsequently, the ownership of Gazprom Capital LLC, key assets of Gazprom Mezhregiongaz LLC in the field of financial markets, fuel and energy and agricultural chemistry.

The second is to transfer the assets of Mezhregiongaz in the social sphere, real estate management, as well as assets that require further restructuring to Gazprom Torgservice, in the same way.

Third, the assets of Mezhregiongaz related to the processing of helium, petroleum products and refined products in the domestic market, as well as in the LNG sector, should be transferred to OOO Gas Oil. (Here it is necessary to recall that the new place of work of Kirill Seleznev in RusChemAlliance is directly related to LNG, and therefore, to Gas Oil.)

Noteworthy is the time period (more precisely, the speed) of execution. It is prescribed to transfer assets to trust management until April 30 (Seleznev quit on the 12th), and to property - until December 31, 2019. If this is not called in a "fire order," then Santa Claus exists. But then the situation looks even more interesting.

In his letter to Miller Mikhailov, he asks for the early dismissal of the former heads of Gazprom Torgservice LLC and Gas Oil LLC, appointing Elena Sekarin and Sergey Ivanin as general directors of these structures. The term is the same - 04/30/2019. Both appointees previously served in Mezhregiongaz not without the direct supervision of Seleznev and Mikhailova: Sekarina - head of the property relations department, Ivanin - head of the legal department.

In other words, following the assets on the basis of which Mezhregiongaz built its main financial schemes, the curators of these schemes were withdrawn. Withdrawn and reappointed to oversee them, but with a promotion, like Ms. Mikhailova herself? It turns out so, but this is not the end of the story.

In order to completely replace all the traces (in the letter it is formulated as “assets that require further restructuring”), Mikhailova asks Miller in the same letter to instruct her to rename Gazprom Torgservice to OOO Gazprom Asset Management, and Gas Oil to LLC Gazprom LNG Assets. The term for amendments to the charters is 05/20/2019 (20 days after the withdrawal of assets and the appointment of new directors).

Let someone throw a stone at us who says that this doesn’t seem like a planned departure to previously prepared positions, but like a chaotic flight to nowhere. To finally dispel possible illusions, as the "cherry on the cake" we present the eighth paragraph of the letter No. 01 / 05-3496 literally:

"8. To amend PJSC Gazprom's order dated 06.06.2016 No. 388 “On improving the organization of control over ensuring the effectiveness of long-term financial investments of PJSC Gazprom, providing for Department 105 (E.V. Mikhailova) as the only unit of the Gazprom administration that is responsible for monitoring to ensure the effectiveness of long-term financial investments in LLC Gas Oil (term: April 30, 2019). ”
Comments are not required here. We just get boring to remind you that the new project by Kirill Seleznev and Alexey Miller “RusChemAlliance” is the long-term financial investment of funds through the Gas Oil line. On April 30, Mezhregiongaz assets are transferred to Gas Oil, a new director is appointed on the same day, and control over the asset is transferred to the Department of Mikhailova. After 20 days, the company receives a new name - Gazprom LNG Assets LLC.

Well forgotten old

Mikhailova’s letter to the name of Alexei Miller ends modestly: “For your decision.” Aleksey Borisovich’s decision was not slow in waiting, and the new scheme of “old” approaches was quickly implemented.

We named three new structures (Gazprom Capital LLC, Gazprom Asset Management LLC and Gazprom LNG Assets LLC), where assets of Mezhregiongaz, previously headed by Kirill Seleznev, and people raised by Kirill Seleznev and schemes created by them were transferred. Kirill Seleznev. But without listing these assets, the reader will not be able to imagine the scale of the “internal empire” that Seleznev built at Gazprom.

We will not list all assets (the list is very large), we will name the key ones for understanding the scope.

Regarding LLC Gas Oil (now Gazprom LNG Assets), we indicated that all Mezhregiongaz assets for the sale of petroleum products and other refined products on the domestic market of Russia, as well as LNG projects, were controlled by this structure. Perhaps the main thing here is the construction project of a liquefied natural gas complex in Ust-Luga worth 2.388 trillion rubles.

Gazprom Capital is associated with Gazprom's financial investments in the corporate stock market. We will name some of the most famous companies whose shares were previously managed by Mezhregiongaz and which were transferred to Gazprom Capital: PJSC Lukoil, PJSC Inter RAO, PJSC Mosenergo, PJSC OGK-2, PJSC Rushydro, PJSC FGC UES. This list also includes shares of Gazprom PJSC, Sogaz JSC and gas giant subsidiaries.

Even in terms of the volume of these two new companies, one can imagine the scope of Kirill Seleznev’s powers and Miller’s level of trust in him. However, without a third company, the picture will be incomplete, especially since this list provided us with particular aesthetic pleasure. The assets of the social sphere and real estate management fell under the control of the newly created Gazprom Asset Management LLC.

Among 47 companies transferred from Mezhregiongaz, our “old acquaintances” based on the first two materials about the Gazprom to Children charity program and the import substitution program. These are Gazprom invest RGK, Gazprom investgazifikatsiya, Gazprom neftekhim Salavat and Mezhregiongaz Technologies (general contractor for the construction of FOCs under the Gazprom to Children program, led by friend Elena Mikhailova T.E. Savostenok). It is also Expoforum JSC (the largest exhibition center in St. Petersburg, built also for children's money) and the Gazprom Social Initiatives Support Fund itself (the manager of the Gazprom for Children program funds).

Now the picture is complete. We add only that among the social facilities previously managed by Mezhregiongaz and having departed, according to Mikhailova’s letter to Gazprom Asset Management, SKA Hockey Club is also listed. That is, Kovalchuk’s fees were paid by Seleznev, and the president of SKA Hockey Club Gennady Timchenko did not even suspect what schemes the “group of comrades” used, hiding behind a hockey club with a great history.

We mention this fact not for the red words, but to make it clear that through Seleznev went all extra-budgetary expenses (or expenses that should have been presented as such) of PJSC Gazprom.
Particularly delightful is the motivation part of Mikhailova’s letter addressed to Miller No. 01 / 05-3496. We quote: “To increase corporate control, bring the Charter of Gazprom Mezhregiongaz LLC in accordance with the model charter of a subsidiary limited liability company approved by the order of PJSC Gazprom dated 03.05.2017 No. 292“ On approval of model charters and the Regulation on corporate governance and control of PJSC Gazprom for the activities of investment objects ”, stipulating in the Charter approval of PJSC Gazprom: - transactions of this company and its affiliated organizations with real estate and with shares / shares in the authorized capital;

- termination of powers / appointments of executive bodies of controlled organizations. ”

Official papers are good in that they do not leave a double interpretation. Having read this part of the letter by Mikhailova in an opposite way, we saw that the Charter of the Seleznev Mezhregiongaz did not comply with the standard charter of Gazprom subsidiaries and the regulation on corporate governance. We can conclude that the Mezregiongaz Seleznyov did NOT AGREE (meaning officially) with Gazprom’s management its real estate transactions and the appointment of executive bodies in organizations controlled by it.

How this was possible contrary to a special internal order, no one seems to know at Gazprom. And judging by the soft (without serious consequences) Seleznev’s move from one chair to another, no one wants to know ...

On the track

When we put the whole mosaic together, a lot fell into place.

It became clear why Seleznev was not fired immediately after Arashukov’s arrest and he didn’t compose a company with his girlfriends in Lefortovo. The oligarchs are not the best part of society from a moral point of view, there is nothing to argue with, but this is the part that knows how to make money. From the foregoing, we can conclude: this same “group of girlfriends” does not earn, but stupidly drags everything that is possible from the state and ordinary gas consumers.

It became clear why the reorganization of Mezhregiongaz was carried out on an emergency basis. Why Mikhailova became a member of the Gazprom Management Committee, and her Department 105 received the sole right to control the effectiveness of long-term financial investments.

Why did the former subordinates of Mikhailova Elena Sekarina and Sergey Ivanin head the new subsidiaries of Gazprom with the old powers and assets that were removed from Mezhregiongaz.

Everything seems to us to be very simple: control over the funds received from various types of activities (gas, gas condensate and oil processing, construction of social facilities under the Gazprom to Children program, ownership and leasing of real estate) PJSC Gazprom , remained in the hands of the same “group of comrades” (Seleznev, Mikhailova, Konovalenko).

The scheme of “work” with the funds received remained the same. Only company names have changed, and personalities have been preserved. Moreover, all participants in the scheme (with the exception of Seleznev) left this story with an increase in official status and an increase in official salaries.

Sometimes we did not believe the documents we found on the network. However, when comparing what was written in them with what was later realized in the gas monopolist, doubts were dispelled.

Usually, according to this matrix, “change names, registration and places of deployment, but do not change principles, personalities and schemes”, various kinds of businessmen act. Any well-established informal system of relations is strong, first of all, by a very rigid distribution of roles. With all due respect to the figure of Kirill Seleznev, we cannot imagine him in the role of the person who pronounces the phrase: “You ask. But you do not ask with respect ... "