Previous attempts at the so-called "conversion" of the defense industry in the USSR in the late 80s and early 90s of the last century in most cases ended in complete failure. Simply because the military-industrial complex built under Stalin lived in a planned, mobilized and cash-strapped economy, and there was really nothing to offer to the population and civil sectors. Plus, the importation of goods through the border demolished all "unique developments of unique scientific teams" to the rock foundation. It turned out that in the big world outside the USSR it had long been invented, made and sold to consumers at a discount.
But in Russia history is not accepted to know, and Kremlin managers sometimes give the impression of duramars who seriously believe that in the economy one can calmly give only orders and directives. At a meeting in Ufa, the Russian commander-in-chief reminded:
Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke about plans to significantly increase the share of civilian products at defense industry enterprises: by 2030, it should grow to 50%. "The strategic goal is to increase the share of civilian products to 30% of the total volume of defense products by 2025, and to 50% by 2030," he said at a meeting on diversifying civilian production at defense enterprises.
For the sake of justice, it must be said that Kremlin managers have been quoting these mantras for years:
Russian President Vladimir Putin in December 2016 set the goal to increase the share of civilian products to no less than 17% by 2020, to 30% of the total production of the Russian defense industry by 2025, and to 50% by 2030. In September, 2017, the head of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, Denis Manturov, noted that the enterprises of the defense industry can reach 20% by 2020 instead of the planned 17%.
Simply put, the high-ranking officials suggested that the arms barons, who were exhausted, tired of shuffling military budgets, should think about the need to live somehow themselves. But please! And who then took in December 2017 a new, fresh and third already in 2006 since the State Program of Armaments (GPV), designed for 2018-2027? Who approved it in January 2018? And where did Putin get the "peak of expenses" in 2020, with their inevitable decrease then if the program was calculated before 2027 ?:
According to him, the release of civilian products should ensure the full loading of defense enterprises and their financial stability, especially after the passage of the peak of the state defense orders and their subsequent reduction after 2020.
Recall that the LG for 2008-2015 was successfully failed in 2011 and was replaced by the GPU until 2020, which was canceled last year due to its more than sluggish success. According to the GPO for 2018-2027, ResFed will spend 19 trillion rubles only on the production of new types of weapons and military equipment for the army. This is 1.9 trillion rubles a year, which is even higher than in 2017, when a little more than 1.5 trillion rubles was spent for this purpose. Separately from 1 to 2 trillion rubles will be spent on the development of the infrastructure and warehouses of the army. Plus, 3 trillion rubles are directed to the production of equipment and weapons for the Ministry of the Interior, Rosgvardia, FSB, SVR and other security agencies. Thus, over 10 years - at least 23 trillion rubles, or almost 40 billion dollars every year (2.3 trillion rubles). And this is only for the development and production of weapons and military equipment! The same amount will be spent on the maintenance of Russian militocrats from the army, special services, controlling and inspecting bodies.
Strange it turns out. With one hand, the colonial managers draw mega budgets for the production of weapons, and the other - require the enterprises of the military-industrial complex not to open too much mouth on a budget pie and learn how to earn money on the market. This is despite the fact that as such, the market in Russia every year skukozhivaetsya and even load successful plants orders in an orderly manner is impossible (Resource Federation is not the USSR, when it was possible for years to work in the warehouse). Where is the logic?
For example, there is such a remarkable enterprise (more precisely, the concern) as "Uralvagozavod". One of the main articles of its civilian products are railroad cars. That's how the production and purchase of cars in the Russian Federation jumped in recent years:
Apparently, in 2015, a "bottom" was reached, but then a new growth cycle began. In 2016, Russia produced up to 36,000 railway cars, and in 2017 - no less than 54 thousand (estimated). Accordingly, the output of this product from Uralvagonzavod also changed drastically: from 28.5 thousand cars in the safe year 2012 it fell to 7.5 thousand cars in the crisis year 2016. And in 2017 the concern produced almost 15 thousand cars. And although it is planned to retain the same amount in 2018, no one knows if the local growth cycle will end in 2019, for example. And after all freight cars are production rather claimed for raw economy. After all, something must be driven to the ports of the forest, coal, mineral fertilizers, grain, metals and so on.
And what about the enterprises of the military industrial complex that produce some highly specialized products? Order instead of army radio stations to release gadgets? Competing with Chinese and American imports? Three years ago, military-style storytellers in Ukrainian way:
Sergey Chemezov, the general director of Rostek, said that he hoped that soon the IPhone, Samsung and other companies would replace our domestic ones. He added that Russia already has one of its own phones - YotaPhone. At the same time he complained that the import details in the Russian IT-products are 100%. "Unfortunately, the share of imports in the sphere of Russian IT is almost 100%," Chemezov said.
Three years have passed, the result is understandable and does not cause surprise. But the inhabitants of the fantasy world do not stop: now they even put their hopes on importing the products of Gazprom's foreign suppliers to the Roscosmos,
This equipment for gas production by American General Electric, One Subsea, Norwegian Aker Solutions, FMC Technologies (USA, Norway). The same companies supplied the Christmas tree, developed chimney modules and suspension systems for tubing, submarine pipeline systems for the shelf. Axon (USA-France), American Weatherford, Baker Oil Tools and Schlumberger were engaged in wellhead equipment and equipment delivery. Heat exchangers, in particular, did the Chart Heat Exchangers, the German Linde and the Swiss Fives Cryogenie.
Indeed, are not the poor and demoralized engineers of enterprises of the military-industrial complex and Roskosmos paying salaries of 20-30 thousand rubles (average in the industry, we will not forget) will not be able to outdo the adversaries of General Electric or Axon? And if they can not, it's their problem.
After all, if the Kremlin clever men are going after the year 2020 to "throw" the inflated defense industry and cosmonautics into free swimming, they can always refer to the fact that they did not subscribe to be grandfathers mazai. A GPV-2027 is just a piece of paper. Beautiful, with figures, graphics, but ... Paper. Especially since the first two LG were crumpled and thrown into the trash.