How much money has Elena Baturina

Forbes magazine published a list of the 20 richest women in Russia. As before, he was headed by Elena Nikolaevna Baturina.
Origin source
There is no doubt that the visible part of the empire of Baturina has significantly decreased in comparison with the ratings of a decade ago. So, just recently, eight years have passed since Baturina broke up with her main asset, Inteko, and there have been no rapid successes since then. However, a series of scandals and courts occurred, within the framework of which it turned out that the empire of Baturina was much larger than Forbes wrote about it.

The fact that Baturin does not take into account all his assets, as is customary and what is assumed by the status of her high-ranking spouse, and in many ways can hide a significant part of them, was clarified by the conflict between Forbes and Baturina. In 2004, a rather ceremonial article appeared in Forbes, in which Baturina stated that the assets acquired by her for 350 million US dollars were not put on the Inteko balance sheet. Baturina considered this a normal practice, since Inteko is a "family" company and there is no one to report to it. Later it turned out that part of Baturina’s assets, according to the media, was held by the nominal owners and her secret partners. Forbes also said that Baturin does not accept supposedly direct gifts in the form of projects and property at a nominal price from Moscow and acts more accurately. There was a long trial regarding the last phrase, which turned history into a comedy. However, he drew attention to the fact that, based on the Forbes article, it was “the practice of withholding projects and property from the public and even from their own husband”. This may include the case with her possession of the infamous Transvaal water park.

Fifty fifty

It seems that even before the Forbes article, Baturina realized: too many visible gifts and benefits from Moscow, her confidently and rapidly growing market share in Moscow, and also a line of partners who want to do business in the capital with the mayor’s wife, attract too much attention and create risks of corruption allegations. The solution was found quite quickly and easily. According to the media, there were partners and beneficiary denominations who diverted attention from Baturina when receiving such multi-million dollar projects for a penny “as a gift” from Moscow. The explicit remained secret for a long time.

Elena Nikolaevna herself could not calmly keep her secrets. So, when already in 2008, Forbes estimated her fortune at $ 4.3 billion, Baturina, not afraid of anything, announced that in fact she actually had $ 10 billion !!!

After that, everyone began to wonder where Elena Nikolaevna was hiding the rest. The first could not stand and poured out the soul of one of the most famous developers in Moscow, Shalva Chigirinsky. In 2009, he said in a London court that he was Baturina’s secret partner in oil and real estate with a 50 to 50 share in projects. Thus, Chigirinsky’s huge portfolio was shared with Baturina, hidden from public attention and from allegations of corruption. What is interesting: even after Chigirinsky’s revelations, no one in Russia became interested in the plot — only the Russian businessman Alexander Lebedev drew the attention of the world community to this case. In 2009, he sent an appeal to the British leadership with a request “to conduct an investigation against Baturina and the entrepreneur Shalva Chigirinsky.

Lebedev explained that Shalva Chigirinsky submitted to the court a document from 2004, signed by him and Baturina, according to which Chigirinsky then donated 50% of his oil and development business to the wife of the capital’s mayor in exchange for assisting him in Moscow in resolving a number of administrative and political questions.

“This is a glaring fact of large-scale international corruption, since Chigirinsky’s business in 2004 was estimated at about 10 billion US dollars. This is perhaps the largest corruption “pullback” in world practice. ”
These 10 billion dollars did not take into account the project of the Rossiya Hotel, since only one of them was estimated at 3.5–4 billion US dollars. With this project in mind, the mayor of São Paulo’s world corruption record of US $ 6 billion could be beaten by Moscow with a margin.

Chigirinsky also admitted that he hid half of 10 billion, that is, 5 billion. But who did Elena Nikolaevna hide about 700-800 million dollars more?

Recently, however, interest in this story has resumed. Brother Baturina went out of prison with a confident gait, demanding through the Russian and foreign courts that her sister pay him his share, both for Inteko assets and for the assets that she had taken from him from Inteko.

And then, unexpectedly, at the click of a finger, another asset keeper Baturina, Sergey Glyadelkin, emerged from the muddy mud. In the spring of 2019, Glyadelkin in his testimony described in detail his development and construction activities in Moscow, starting in the early 2000s, giving a detailed list of his projects and information about his “agreements”. The list of Glyadelkin's projects partially coincided with the list of projects attributed to Baturina, and partly consisted of those that were very cheaply received from the city by Glyadelkin himself. Glyadelkin and Tkach, the former heads of the 100% subsidiary of Inteko, LLC Inteko Center, as well as a significant part of the members of their team, come from Ukraine, where, incidentally, Baturina’s family comes from. From their activities, we can conclude that they first took over the property of Elena Nikolaevna, and then also in Ukrainian, technically, by the hands of the Russian special services left it for themselves. Yes Yes. Shalva Chigirinsky, in a fit of incomprehensible courage, was not afraid to publicly admit that he secretly owned assets worth $ 10 billion together with Baturina, hid such a partnership and, apparently, even gave Baturina assets for his own before the authorities of the Russian Federation and other countries, banks and shareholders of his public companies. Glyadelkin went the other way and declared what he received from and through Baturina.

From 2002 to 2009, numerous projects worth over a billion US dollars were executed at Glyadelkin and his comrades. In 2008, these assets were estimated at nearly 800 million US dollars. It seems that these are just those 800 million from the Baturin 10 billion as of 2008.

When the chair staggered under the mayor, Glyadelkin turned to the “office” and for many months recorded his conversations with Moscow benefactors as part of a special operation by security officials. As the great deputy Luzhkov V.I. taught Resin: “To betray in time is to anticipate”!

Weaver List - Glyadelkina

Glyadelkin’s appeal to the Russian special services put on the verge of dismissal of an official of the mayor of Tkach - because of the dubious amount of 2 million US dollars and for a miniature real estate. Only now it became clear from the list of Glyadelkin that, apparently, it was he who had taken away huge assets from Baturina, hiding under the “roof” of Feoktistov from the FSB. There is an assumption that unreliable operatives helped Glyadelkin to technically "rob" the mayor’s wife. Perhaps this is why some of the tapes recorded with Ryabinin and Glyadelkin talk were not voiced at the Ryabinin trial. The law enforcement authorities pretended that they did not notice what real assets Baturin and Glyadelkin were hiding from Inteko and that these assets were allegedly taken away by Glyadelkin, not paying off with Baturina. But Baturina resigned herself to the loss, so as not to lose more.

In the spring of 2019, Igor Tkach (Glyadelkin's cousin) on the same day, almost identical with the text Glyadelkin, gave evidence to the FSB, in an outburst of frankness, reporting unheard of about himself. According to Tkach, “as of 2005, he and Glyadelkin had a lot of investment projects at various stages of implementation, including at the following addresses in Moscow: Dolgorukovskaya, 33, building 8 (823.00 sq.m) , st. Bakhrushina, d. 13 (27 758 sq. M), Kostomarovsky passage, d. 2 (2697.20 sq. M), st. Novokuznetskaya, d. 7/11, p. 1 (4061.2 sq.m), ul. Vereyskaya, d. 5 (11,282 sq.m), st. General Dorokhov, house 2 (10 418 sq.m), Ochakovskoe highway, house 12 (3697 sq.m), st. Kotlyakovsky, d.7 / 8 (20 247 sq.m), Ilmensky proezd, 4 (19 169 sq.m), st. Kotlyakovsky, d. 8/10 (16 962 sq.m), Moscow region, Shchelkovo, st. Moskovskaya, d. 24 (10848 sq.m), Leningradskoye shosse, d. 25 (129 700 sq. M), st. Novokuznetskaya, d. 7/11, p. 3,4,5,7 (9815 sq.m), Kurkino district, microdistrict 8 (34,446 sq.m), Leninsky prospekt, 109 (75,353 sq.m) , st. Salome Neris, ow. 12 (250,000 sq.m), st. Kosygina, d. 4-6 (12 738 sq.m), st. 2nd Brest, d. 19/18 (27 616 sq.m), intersection of ul. Kherson and st. Nametkina (207 900 sq.m), Moscow region, Shchelkovo, st. Moscow, 24 (2nd stage, 102 188 sq. M)). In total, according to an estimate that Glyadelkin was not too lazy to do with Kushman, the cost of these projects is almost 800 million US dollars. About 40 million US dollars of long-term funds were spent on the acquisition of these projects (also not their own, but provided by Sberbank, MDM Bank and Raiffeisenbank).

If you take this information seriously, they used the secret city data on encumbrances and property rights to interesting land plots (low-rise or old houses located in good places of the city on solid land plots), which in one way or another through state unitary enterprises, city joint-stock companies, investment contracts with the city or the programs of the Department of Investment Programs were involved with some acquaintances.

In addition to their personal list, they said that before the departure of Tkach to a profitable public service in the Moscow government, the purpose of which was to conclude or endorse contracts with people like Glyadelkin, Tkach was supposed to get 27% in Glyadelkin's business. Is this possible without collusion? After leaving the Moscow government, Weaver received the indicated 27% “Avenue holding GMBH” (with a market value of 27 million US dollars, paying only a modest 50 thousand euros). At least, such conclusions can be drawn from Austria's open property databases. At the same time, in their testimonies, they referred even to the market assessment of their business by Cushman & Wakefield (with the same projects) for solidity. So this is a third of almost 800 million US dollars, based on an estimate of Cushman & Wakefield - more than 337 million dollars. Not bad for several years of work in the departments of the government of Moscow!

For what purpose could one give such evidence - about the reward for assistance, about receiving projects almost for nothing? The answer is simple: they tried to make excuses - this is supposedly their own, and not Baturina. For some reason, they returned to the plot, which everyone had already forgotten about. But they give out such a list, almost a billion US dollars. Like, they are such ingenious entrepreneurs, they received almost all of these projects from the Moscow government (or from some acquaintances, or relatives, whom they entered in the intermediate link between themselves and the city). One gets the impression that the detectives voluntarily or involuntarily lured Glyadelkin and Weaver into a trap. However, having betrayed their testimony during court trials in military courts, operatives threw a public challenge to their superiors. Those who in 2011 didn’t notice Baturina’s scheme. Nobody would have recalled this now if it were not for the talkativeness of Glyadelkin and the interests of Viktor Baturin who had left prison. And all because Glyadelkin, apparently, took away from Baturina that she herself had “squeezed” from her brother, and before that - from the city of Moscow. It is clear that the decision by all to command to close their eyes was made in 2011 not by operas, but by higher authorities. Close your ears and not listen to the tapes from the criminal case Ryabinin also ordered someone "from above." And in 2019, the opera themselves already became bosses and decided to play the old decks of cards on the new one behind the backs of senior officials.

It turns out that the leaders of Russian special services, in particular Zakharov, already in the early 2000s knew perfectly well who Glyadelkin was, where he came from, as well as what and how he was doing. Ryabinin himself told the investigators about such a frank conversation with the head of the power department in Moscow, Zakharov. He hoped that everyone mentioned in the testimony should be questioned. But this did not happen in the case of Zakharov. The case was curtailed and closed; the facts were not investigated.

Mysterious Contracts

We questioned a number of major developers, and they confirmed the possible nature of success in unexpectedly getting Glyadelkin a huge number of first-class projects almost for nothing from Inteko or directly from Moscow with the assistance of Resin and Ryabinin. They also talked about the sensational story of the bankrupt GUP Mosstroyresurs, which bought part of the assets of Trust MSM-1 CJSC (owned by Inteko) in the form of four companies through Glyadelkin Avenue Group. A year later, the State Unitary Enterprise itself goes bankrupt. Having paid 2.3 billion rubles ($ 70 million), the city didn’t receive anything, having lost the mayor’s beloved state unitary enterprise, which was once created in order to buy bulk cement from Elena Nikolaevna from its plants for further distribution to Moscow construction sites. Conveniently! Well, he was gone, and $ 200 million of debts to leading Russian banks and companies remained outstanding. But didn’t Glyadelkin’s company in bankruptcy, as a result, buy the best equipment for a penny and again rent it out to everyone?

We also decided to ask state bankers. It turned out that Glyadelkin and Tkach allegedly came to Eurofinance Mosnarbank and collaborated with him as representatives of Inteko (its subsidiary Inteko Center) - with business cards of the heads of Inteko Center, presentations of Inteko, the Inteko team and generally acted on behalf of Inteko. At that time, Baturina was the chairman of the board at Inteko Center, and the board consisted of Soloshchansky and Edel - all the leading leaders of the group. The weaver was the general director, and Glyadelkin held one of the leading positions. Everything changed on the day when Moscow in 2008 unexpectedly lost a dispute over the reconstruction project of the Rossiya Hotel, in which Baturina, apparently, was Chigirinsky’s secret partner. The Luzhkov government immediately declared a “war” to Eurofinance Mosnarbank, starting to stop all projects in Moscow under city programs that the bank credited as part of project financing. The decision not to allow Moscow to transfer ownership of a substantial part of the historical part of the Moscow Kremlin without a real tender with a development project of 230 thousand square meters with an estimated profit of billions of dollars to the Cypriot offshore subsidiary, which was followed by the interests of Chigirinsky and Baturina, was, of course, not taken by the bank . However, it seems that the unbelievable thing happened - the projects that Eurofinance Mosnarbank credited in Moscow, Moscow simply stopped for several years without explaining the reasons, then lobbied for the adoption of the federal law on the city’s immunity under old investment contracts, and then created the conditions for concluding a bonded deal with the city for the repurchase of co-investment rights by a 100% municipal company for about 50% of the actual borrowed funds. All projects after a few years cheaply migrated to PIK to Gordeev.

The editors decided to check what is in open sources with references to Glyadelkin and his companies. It turned out that a lot. Not even the old stories of the purchase of property of Mosstroymekhanizatsiya-1 OJSC after two contract killings of a key creditor and a key manager are interesting - this was a long time ago and the press wrote about this in the early 2000s. Our attention was attracted not even by the list of Tkach-Glyadelkin projects and by their toilet business in the center of Moscow, about which Ivan Golunov already colorfully wrote in his investigation. Scandalous fresh plots with subcontractors of Glyadelkin at the construction sites of Segezha, a subsidiary of AFK Sistema, are also common, and this will not surprise anyone. And here are the recent mysterious Minstroi contracts of almost $ 300 million that went through Glyadelkin (or Baturina, CJSC Trust MSM-1), because on the Inteko website it is listed as belonging to Inteko during the period of Baturina’s ownership and in the perimeter of the sale to Sberbank at the end of 2011 that didn’t make it) to unknown international cooperation projects, this is already more interesting. The Ministry of Construction itself hints that these funds allegedly went to some unrecognized republics and that it is indecent to ask about this, since three contracts were concluded on the basis of a secret order of the Russian government. At the same time, two out of five contracts for billions of rubles, which are not secret, have not been found in the list of executed since 2016, although judging by the text of the contracts, advances were paid. Taking into account the fact that all other contractors of the Ministry of Construction do not have contracts with an average cost of more than 5 million rubles, this is one of two things: either this is the usual traceless disappearance of almost the entire amount of allocated state funds, or a particularly important state task did take place. But if so, then why do we find data on these operations in public sources? After all, special operations are carried out under the cover of secrecy and are entrusted to the most trusted and trusted people. It is unlikely that Glyadelkin was used for special missions, since he is a Croatian citizen, a native of Ukraine and a participant in scandalous stories, living mainly abroad - either in Zagreb, or in Vienna, or in France.