These 10 billion dollars did not take into account the project of the Rossiya Hotel, since only one of them was estimated at 3.5–4 billion US dollars. With this project in mind, the mayor of São Paulo’s world corruption record of US $ 6 billion could be beaten by Moscow with a margin.
Chigirinsky also admitted that he hid half of 10 billion, that is, 5 billion. But who did Elena Nikolaevna hide about 700-800 million dollars more?
Recently, however, interest in this story has resumed. Brother Baturina went out of prison with a confident gait, demanding through the Russian and foreign courts that her sister pay him his share, both for Inteko assets and for the assets that she had taken from him from Inteko.
And then, unexpectedly, at the click of a finger, another asset keeper Baturina, Sergey Glyadelkin, emerged from the muddy mud. In the spring of 2019, Glyadelkin in his testimony described in detail his development and construction activities in Moscow, starting in the early 2000s, giving a detailed list of his projects and information about his “agreements”. The list of Glyadelkin's projects partially coincided with the list of projects attributed to Baturina, and partly consisted of those that were very cheaply received from the city by Glyadelkin himself. Glyadelkin and Tkach, the former heads of the 100% subsidiary of Inteko, LLC Inteko Center, as well as a significant part of the members of their team, come from Ukraine, where, incidentally, Baturina’s family comes from. From their activities, we can conclude that they first took over the property of Elena Nikolaevna, and then also in Ukrainian, technically, by the hands of the Russian special services left it for themselves. Yes Yes. Shalva Chigirinsky, in a fit of incomprehensible courage, was not afraid to publicly admit that he secretly owned assets worth $ 10 billion together with Baturina, hid such a partnership and, apparently, even gave Baturina assets for his own before the authorities of the Russian Federation and other countries, banks and shareholders of his public companies. Glyadelkin went the other way and declared what he received from and through Baturina.
From 2002 to 2009, numerous projects worth over a billion US dollars were executed at Glyadelkin and his comrades. In 2008, these assets were estimated at nearly 800 million US dollars. It seems that these are just those 800 million from the Baturin 10 billion as of 2008.
When the chair staggered under the mayor, Glyadelkin turned to the “office” and for many months recorded his conversations with Moscow benefactors as part of a special operation by security officials. As the great deputy Luzhkov V.I. taught Resin: “To betray in time is to anticipate”!
Weaver List - Glyadelkina
Glyadelkin’s appeal to the Russian special services put on the verge of dismissal of an official of the mayor of Tkach - because of the dubious amount of 2 million US dollars and for a miniature real estate. Only now it became clear from the list of Glyadelkin that, apparently, it was he who had taken away huge assets from Baturina, hiding under the “roof” of Feoktistov from the FSB. There is an assumption that unreliable operatives helped Glyadelkin to technically "rob" the mayor’s wife. Perhaps this is why some of the tapes recorded with Ryabinin and Glyadelkin talk were not voiced at the Ryabinin trial. The law enforcement authorities pretended that they did not notice what real assets Baturin and Glyadelkin were hiding from Inteko and that these assets were allegedly taken away by Glyadelkin, not paying off with Baturina. But Baturina resigned herself to the loss, so as not to lose more.
In the spring of 2019, Igor Tkach (Glyadelkin's cousin) on the same day, almost identical with the text Glyadelkin, gave evidence to the FSB, in an outburst of frankness, reporting unheard of about himself. According to Tkach, “as of 2005, he and Glyadelkin had a lot of investment projects at various stages of implementation, including at the following addresses in Moscow: Dolgorukovskaya, 33, building 8 (823.00 sq.m) , st. Bakhrushina, d. 13 (27 758 sq. M), Kostomarovsky passage, d. 2 (2697.20 sq. M), st. Novokuznetskaya, d. 7/11, p. 1 (4061.2 sq.m), ul. Vereyskaya, d. 5 (11,282 sq.m), st. General Dorokhov, house 2 (10 418 sq.m), Ochakovskoe highway, house 12 (3697 sq.m), st. Kotlyakovsky, d.7 / 8 (20 247 sq.m), Ilmensky proezd, 4 (19 169 sq.m), st. Kotlyakovsky, d. 8/10 (16 962 sq.m), Moscow region, Shchelkovo, st. Moskovskaya, d. 24 (10848 sq.m), Leningradskoye shosse, d. 25 (129 700 sq. M), st. Novokuznetskaya, d. 7/11, p. 3,4,5,7 (9815 sq.m), Kurkino district, microdistrict 8 (34,446 sq.m), Leninsky prospekt, 109 (75,353 sq.m) , st. Salome Neris, ow. 12 (250,000 sq.m), st. Kosygina, d. 4-6 (12 738 sq.m), st. 2nd Brest, d. 19/18 (27 616 sq.m), intersection of ul. Kherson and st. Nametkina (207 900 sq.m), Moscow region, Shchelkovo, st. Moscow, 24 (2nd stage, 102 188 sq. M)). In total, according to an estimate that Glyadelkin was not too lazy to do with Kushman, the cost of these projects is almost 800 million US dollars. About 40 million US dollars of long-term funds were spent on the acquisition of these projects (also not their own, but provided by Sberbank, MDM Bank and Raiffeisenbank).