The owner of the ChTPZ Group Andrei Komarov started playing politics

After quitting the arrest, the oligarch hid and transported his family to the United States. According to experts, he can silently sponsor oppositionist Alexei Navalny.
Now one of the richest people in Russia, Andrei Komarov, almost does not appear in the information field. After his arrest and sudden release, he hid. The oligarch's family moved to the United States, and he spends most of his time abroad, visiting his factories as a gentleman to see his estates with peasants. However, Komarov's calm is only a blatant one - beginning in 2012 he can be one of the sources of funding for the Russian opposition.

How it all began? Navalny-Volkov-Krasheninnikov-Khanin-Komarov

Recently, a rather interesting version of political scientist Alexander Ustinov appeared on the Internet, according to which Andrei Komarov is behind the financing of Alexei Navalny. The chain turned out to be confusing - it features the Ural publicist Fedor Krasheninnikov, PNTZ publisher Alexander Khanin, the right hand of Alexei Navalny Leonid Volkov.

Fedor Krasheninnikov positions himself as a true liberal and a fighter with Putin's regime. Calls himself the closest associate of the president, and most of his columns on various sites present funny panegyrics with calls to oppose the current government. In this case, Krasheninnikov himself on the barricades somehow does not tear, preferring to Bavaria and Tuscany the Russian cold. In general, Fyodor Krasheninnikov is a real Russian liberal who in words wants and dreams to save Russia from the tyranny of Putin, but at the same time he makes good money on this tyranny. And it's not even in the columns and publications in which Krasheninnikov speaking against Putin is trying to make money. We are talking about banal work as a technologist for local self-government bodies, government bodies and the same "United Russia".

At the same time, in conversations and numerous interviews Krasheninnikov is denied the fact that he is working for United Russia. The nuance is that at Fed Fedor worked mainly in the past (now ALMOST does not work), and also in that he worked always indirectly. Fedor was usually hired as a technologist and consultant, and parties do not do it directly, nor do they pay for services usually with black money. Meanwhile, sometimes Krasheninnikov was attracted as a media man who served the interests of the EP party and the authorities. A few years ago Krasheninnikov was the co-founder and the actual ideological inspirer of the UralBusinessConsulting project (UrBK). Krasheninnikov also affiliated with the publication "Political Council", where everyone is invited to get consulting services if they want to become politicians. Companies close to Krasheninnikov received funding from the governments of regions, local governments located on the territory of the Urals Federal District, as well as from commercial enterprises. Among the firms that finance UrBC, there are those who are affiliated with PNTZ.

There is nothing strange - Krasheninnikov worked actively in Pervouralsk, which his business publications also wrote about. That is, Krasheninnikov's legally binding relations with PNTZ are minimal, but the actual mass. It should also be added that Leonid Volkov is from Pervouralsk. At the same time, the peak of contracts with Pervouralsk and Krasheninnikov's working contacts in general falls on 2012-2013 - exactly when a new PR man, Alexander Khanin, appeared at PNTZ.

Indeed, a bunch of Krasheninnikov-Volkov appeared in the surroundings of Navalny in late 2012 - just after the case against the owner of ChTPZ, Andrei Komarov, began to fall apart. And it's hard to call it an accidental coincidence - at the same time Alexander Khanin was appointed to PNTZ (part of ChTPZ group), which we already wrote about. Apparently Andrei Komarov wishing to avoid the responsibility for a bribe (in the end, the case also collapsed) was actively engaged in PR, and the main PR specialist of the PNTZ group was A. Khanin.

Alexander Khanin - confidant of Komarov and liberals

In 2011, Pervouralsk hosted the last direct election of the mayor. Contrary to the desire of Andrei Komarov, the owner of the city-forming enterprise PNTZ, people chose the head of Yuri Pereverzev, a communist and populist. In journalistic circles Alexander Alekseevich Khanin is characterized polarly. From the hilarious "touchy overgrown karapuz" to the almost mystical "gray cardinal". However, the "Karapuz", which manages a city of 150,000 people, is, of course, doubly interesting.

Pervouralsk political relations with local elites. In the end, Komarov tried to take control of the local administration. Initially, Komarov hired political technologist Eduard Koridorov to conduct military operations. He in turn invited a dozen more specialists. To remove Yuri Pereverzev from the post of head of the municipality for some reason decided not by the usual Russian way - a criminal case and prison, but a complex long and multistage one. To send Pereverzev to retirement was the Kumarov-controlled Pervouralsk City Duma, having submitted three unsatisfactory marks. Then change the Charter in the city and introduce a two-headed municipal government. The plan was "long" - in the future Komarov planned to keep the local Duma under control and administer the local administration.

In 2013, Khanina was fired from the "Russian Copper Company" and he urgently sought to settle down. In principle, Khanin settled on the warm place of Koridorov, who left to work for another project and the Komarov project would have been successfully implemented. But this did not work for Khanin. Instead, Khanin for some reason decided to flirt with the liberals and hired a lot of technologists to work, inflated the expenditure part and prolonged the political war, but in the other direction and in fact with the past allies.

At some point, Hanin's liberals began to lose too much money. But this is only the official version - money to those who led the "fighting" in Pervouralsk did not reach. But they reached the liberals and those who supported the Navalny. before Krasheninnikov and then Volkova. The inflation of the political war budget in Pervouralsk was necessary as a disguise to hide from the public the real direction of cash flows. The fact that Khanin did not manage to keep himself was a liberal. Pervouralsk reached the same crumbs.

As a result, Khanin turned out to be a very important person surrounded by Komarov. In fact, he began to control the local administration, managed to earn a good personal political capital, took a personal (and not Komarov) local Duma. But most importantly, in the hands of Khanin was in fact an additional dirt on Komarov - the fact that PNTZ money went to liberals. It is not at all surprising that Khanin actually commands both PNTZ and Pervouralsk - now Komarov depends too much on what Khanin knows. But do not think that the financing of the liberals was a personal initiative of Khanin. Most likely it was Komarov's personal assignment.

It would seem, why would Komarov finance Navalny?

Andrei Komarov is very familiar with Sugrobov and Kolesnikov's group SUEBiPK - it was because of their activities that he was behind bars. The scandal began with the fact that FSB operatives and employees of the Main Directorate for Combating Economic Crimes and Anti-Corruption (GUEBiPK) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia detained $ 300,000 to the auditor of the FSUE "Promresurs" Alexander Shibanov. And the next day Andrei Komarov was already in custody.

The enterprise received 1.8 billion rubles from the budget in the framework of reimbursement of 20% of the cost of property related to mobilization capacities. State money was accurately written off, but no real mobilization measures were taken. In particular, the auditors considered that the workshop "Height 239" was unreasonably included in the list of mobilization capacities. According to the investigation, trying to hush up the scandal, the management of ChTPZ offered the auditor of FSUE "Promresurs" 300 thousand dollars to "settle" the issue, having destroyed the mobilization plan for 2011 and corrected the verification report. However, the auditor appealed to the law enforcement agencies, which led Shibanov's lawyer to the remand prison, and billionaire Komarov under house arrest.

The prosecution could bring charges against Komarov not only for attempting to bribe the auditor, but also for fraud with the reimbursement of money for the mobilization resource. But soon after Komarov's arrest strange things began to happen. First, contrary to the data of the "Promresurs" check, Deputy Prosecutor General Viktor Grinh stopped the fraudulent case as "unreasonable and illegal." Apparently, the illegal use of funds was not denied, just as it was not denied that the head of the enterprise tried to give a bribe to the inspector, but it was ... illegal to bring a case on this to the supervisory authority.

And then the business of bribery was stopped because of the absence of corpus delicti. It was then that the secret of the strange location of the Prosecutor General's Office towards billionaire Komarov may be in his relations with the government, specifically with former vice-premier and former minister of industry and trade, and now chairman of the board of the Eurasian Economic Commission Viktor Khristenko. Komarov himself recognizes friendship with Khristenko, but denies any affiliation in business.

Believe in this is not easy, given that in 2011, Vladimir Khristenko, son of the then Minister of Industry and Trade Viktor Khristenko, joined the board of directors of OAO ChTPZ (also owned by Komarov). And his career in the company Khristenko Jr. began in the early 2000's. In 2005 he worked as the general director of the service division of the ChTPZ group, from 2007 to 2010 he was the general director of the oil service division of the ChTPZ group, and after that he headed the new project of the ChTPZ group in the field of development, in particular, oversaw the construction of golf courses.

A logical question arises: how did Viktor Khristenko influence the same GUEBiPK, i.e. people of Eugene Shkolov. The explanation can be found in the biography of both - in 2004, Yevgeny Shkolov worked at OAO AK Transneft as a member of the board of directors, and Viktor Khristenko was chairman of the board of directors.

Thus, between Shkolov and Khristenko there was at least a good acquaintance back in 2004. In general, in the process of studying information in the public domain, it becomes obvious that at some point the staff of the GUEBiPK forgot about the existence of the ChTPZ group, and Andrei Komarov was at large due to Khristenko's successful patronage (and his acquaintance with Shkolov). About the fact that Khristenko has close ties with the ChTPZ group, it becomes clear - it is enough to find out that Khristenko's son worked in the ChTPZ group.

It can not be ruled out that the payment for "services" of Navalny from Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant was forced - a conditional tax for lack of interest on the part of GUEBC.
In fact, the payment of the activity of the liberals was compelled for Komarov. In addition to solving issues through V.Khristenko with GUEBiPK (Sugrbov and Kolesnikov), he also received exits to the highest political strata of Russia.

In other words, a complex deal could have taken place. GUEBCP closes the case against Komarov, who in turn takes on the risks of financing the liberal opposition. It was after the collapse of the case that Khanin was brought in under Komarov, who was instructed to finance projects affiliated with Krasheninnikov. The latter, in turn, could transfer funds to L.Volkov. At the same time, A. Navalny takes Volkov himself in fact as a "right hand" and a person who fully ensures his activities, including. carries out the financing of staffs and the opening of Navalny's departments.

There is nothing strange about the fact that at the present time the Yekaterinburg headquarters of Navalny is headed by Zits Chairman Viktor Barmin from Pervouralsk, and the actual head of the headquarters is Fyodor Krasheninninikov. In this connection, when the links between Komarov and Navalny are looked over too obviously, the oligarch decided not to take risks and spend most of his time abroad.