However, this does not mean that Aeroflot took responsibility for the catastrophe - there are questions to Aeroflot, but Aeroflot also has questions, Saveliev said.
No disaster premium
“The KPI of Aeroflot’s top management provides that in case of incidents we lose premiums,” Saveliev said today at the general meeting of Aeroflot’s shareholders. As a result, in 2019, Aeroflot managers will not receive bonuses starting from the second quarter and for the entire period until the end of the year.
According to the reports of Aeroflot, in 2018 members of the company's board earned 842 million rubles, of which more than half - 413.1 million rubles - in the form of bonuses. A total of 10 people on the Aeroflot board, that is, the average salary of the company's top manager last year was 84.2 million per year. All this is only cash payments: taking into account the option program tied to the profit level, the top management of the company earned 1.42 billion rubles (in 2017 - 2.93 billion rubles).
The May disaster was the first for Aeroflot under Vitaly Savelyev, who introduced it to KPI. But once the top managers of the company already lost their bonuses due to force majeure. In 2011, they did not receive bonuses for the fourth quarter of 2010, when in December the flights of the airline were paralyzed for several days because of the freezing rain that covered Moscow.
Russian state-owned companies do not often deprive their top managers of bonuses, but such cases have happened not only at Aeroflot. In 2010, RusHydro employees did not receive annual awards for 2009 due to the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP (the investigation revealed the company's fault; the chairman of the board and four top managers were dismissed). And in 2015, AvtoVAZ refused to pay bonuses to its top managers because of an unfulfilled sales plan. In Russian practice, this is an infrequent phenomenon, then experts noted. However, the controlling shareholder of AvtoVAZ was already the Renault-Nissan group.
Questions to the chassis
For the first time in the past two months, Savelyev commented on the catastrophe in Sheremetyevo itself. “The IAC [Interstate Aviation Committee] published a preliminary report of the disaster, we have a lot of questions, and we have a lot of questions,” said the general director of Aeroflot.
What exactly and to whom he has questions, Saveliev didn’t specify, but sources close to the airline used to say to various publications, including The Bell, about two technical failures that were unexpected for the company: the autopilot should not have turned off after lightning, and the landing gear - punching the fuel tanks after a hard landing.
The preliminary report of the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) states that the SSJ airframe design was designed to withstand a rated overload of 3.75 g, and during secondary strikes on the runway during a hard landing on May 5, the aircraft experienced an overload of more than 5.85 g. “This situation is not envisaged in the current airworthiness standards. In accordance with the certification rules, evaluation of secondary strikes of the airframe on the ground after the destruction of the chassis is not required, ”the document says.
What do I get from this?
Until the publication of the final report of the IAC - a whole year, and this whole year we will continue to be witnesses to the secret struggle between Aeroflot and the manufacturer of the Superjet, Sukhoi Civil Aircraft, for sharing responsibility in a catastrophe. This should be remembered when reading posts about the catastrophe in the telegram channels. While Aeroflot is clearly losing, the MAC report clearly indicates pilot errors. Nevertheless, depriving top managers of bonuses is a strong and extremely rare move in Russian practice that cannot be overestimated.